SARS in Taiwan: an overview and lessons learned  by Chen, Kow-Tong et al.
SARS in Taiwan: an overview and lessons learned
International Journal of Infectious Diseases (2005) 9, 77—85
http://intl.elsevierhealth.com/journals/ijidKow-Tong Chena,b, Shiing-Jer Twuc, Hsiao-Ling Changa,
Yi-Chun Wua, Chu-Tzu Chena, Ting-Hsiang Lind,
Sonja J. Olsene, Scott F. Dowelle, Ih-Jen Suf,*
Taiwan SARS Response Team1
aField Epidemiology Training Program, Department of Health, Center for Diseases Control, Taiwan
bTaipei City STD Control Center, Department of Health, Taipei City, Taiwan
cDivision of Health Policy Research, National Health Research Institutes, Taiwan
dDivision of Laboratory and Research, Department of Health, Center for Diseases Control, Taiwan
eInternational Emerging Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Bangkok, Thailand
fCenter for Disease Control, Department of Health, No. 6—8F,
Lin-Shen South Road, Taipei, TaiwanReceived 24 November 2003; received in revised form 19 March 2004; accepted 7 April 2004
Corresponding Editor: Michael Whitby, Brisbane, Australia
KEYWORDS
Severe acute
respiratory
syndrome;
Isolation;
Quarantine;
Contact tracing
Summary
Objectives: This report aims to describe the epidemiology of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan between March and July 2003, and to examine the public
health response.
Methods: Surveillance for SARS was initiated on 14 March 2003. Response activities
are described for the isolation of patients; contact tracing; quarantine of contact
persons; fever screening for inbound and outbound passengers at the airport; and
hospital infection control as assessed by mobile SARS containment teams.
Results: Between 14 March and 30 July 2003 a total of 668 probable cases of SARS
were reported. Of the 668 cases, 181 (27%) were fatal. Compared to the survivors,
fatal cases weremore likely to be older (p < 0.001), male (p < 0.05), exposed through
hospital contact (p < 0.001), and have a coexisting medical disorder (p < 0.001).
Between 28 March and 30 July a total of 151,270 persons were quarantined. Among
them, 46 (3.0/10,000) were subsequently classified as being probable SARS cases. At* Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 2 2231 5307; fax: +886 2 2231 5275.
E-mail address: ktchen@health.gov.tw (K.-T. Chen).
1 Taiwan SARS Response Team: Taiwan: Ming-Liang Lee, Chein-Jen Chen, Ping-Fuai Wu, Tsung-Hsi Wang, Chao A. Hsiung, Mei-Shang Ho,
Chuang-Chuan King; CDC-USA: Susan Maloney, Daniel Jernigan, Jim Lando, Tamara L. Fisk, James M. Simmerman; WHO: Babatunde
Olowokure, K. O’Bai Kamara, Howard Sobel, Cathy Roth.
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78 K.-T. Chen et al.the time of the mobile team assessments, 46 (53%) hospitals had implemented WHO
infection control recommendations.
Conclusions: In this outbreak, an emergency plan consisted of patient isolation and
strict hospital infection control.
# 2004 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved.Introduction
The worldwide spread of a novel coronavirus that
causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
proceeded with unprecedented rapidity, over-
whelming many hospitals and public health systems
in a matter of weeks.1,2 As of 11 July 2003, a total of
8437 cases were reported from 32 countries.3 In
many locations, the introduction of the disease by
ill travellers was soon followed by spread to health
care workers and household contacts.4,5
This report describes the epidemiology of the
SARS outbreak in Taiwan and proposes strategies
for addressing response operations after any emer-
ging outbreaks in the future. Further, the lessons
learned from the response to this outbreak may help
to improve current strategies for preventing out-
breaks of infectious diseases and for distributing
resources efficiently during response operations.Background
Taiwan has a population of approximately
22,549,292. The main island is divided into 22 cities
and counties. Taiwan, with its close proximity to the
SARS epicenters of Guangdong and Hong Kong, and
its extensive business and cultural ties, has many
travellers from the most affected areas. Each year
more than four million Taiwanese visit mainland
China for business and tourism (Bureau of Immigra-
tion Ministry of the Interior) and the vast majority of
flights return through Hong Kong. Although Taiwan
was removed from the list of affected areas on 5 July
2003, it will remain at risk from the importation and
spread of SARS should it re-emerge.3,6Methods
Surveillance
On 14 March 2003, the day the first cases were
reported, Taiwan’s Department of Health initiated
a system to respond to the potential spread of SARS
resulting from the cases. A Task Force Committee
established medical aid teams to address disruptionin the quarantine system; to conduct rapid assess-
ment by reviewing every reported SARS case within
three days after the first case was reported; and to
implement a legislative procedure for reporting
SARS on 28 March. All suspected SARS cases were
required by law to be reported to the Department of
Health, and health authorities were required to
deliver protective equipment including N-95 masks
to the SARS hospitals immediately and to equip all
healthcare workers with enhanced protective
equipment.
Isolation of SARS cases
Beginning with the recognition of the first SARS case
on 14 March, Taiwan moved aggressively to isolate
all suspect or probable cases in negative pressure
rooms and to equip all healthcare workers with
enhanced protective equipment. Specially designed
isolation rooms with HEPA filtered air, negative
pressure under continuous electronic monitoring,
and separate bathrooms and anterooms are com-
monly available in larger referral hospitals. Until 22
April most of the probable cases were cared for in
such hospital settings. From 23 April to 8 May, the
277 new cases overwhelmed the capacity of the
hospital system to care for all patients in negative
pressure rooms.
Contact tracing
When a SARS case was reported, local public health
workers pursued a case investigation and confirmed
adequate home quarantine of all contacts. The case
investigation reviewed the patient’s history of expo-
sure to patients with SARS or SARS-affected areas,
reviewed the signs and symptoms as compared to
the WHO case definition of SARS,7 and collected
information on the patient’s recent close contacts.
Mortality
Death certificates were obtained from the statistics
division of the Ministry of Interior in Taiwan. Infor-
mation from death certificates was used to deter-
mine the cause of death. Mortality was estimated by
dividing the number of deaths by the total number
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known outcome and was irrespective of the immedi-
ate cause of death.8
Laboratory investigation
Nasopharyngeal swab or stool specimens were
obtained from reported patients and tested for
SARS-Co-V by the laboratory of the Center for Dis-
ease Control at the Department of Health in Taiwan.
The viral RNA was extracted and reverse transcrip-
tase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was com-
pleted for targets specific to various RNA viruses,
including the influenza A and B viruses and SARS-Co-
V. A specimen was considered RT-PCR-positive for
SARS-Co-V if at least two different clinical speci-
mens were positive (e.g., nasopharyngeal and
stool), the same clinical specimens collected on
two or more occasions during the course of the
illness were positive (e.g., sequential nasopharyn-
geal aspirates), or if two different assays or repeat
PCR using a new RNA extract from the original
clinical sample on each occasion of testing were
positive.7
Quarantine
Quarantine was implemented on 18 March for per-
sons meeting one of two sets of criteria, designed as
class A or class B. Class A included healthcare work-
ers exposed outside isolation settings, family and
other close contacts, and those on airplanes with ill
SARS patients if seated within three rows in front or
three rows behind the patient. Initially, the duration
of quarantine was 14 days, but after 10 June this was
revised to ten days in accordance with the incuba-
tion period for SARS.1,5,6 Hospital staff and patients
who had been in contact with a SARS patient were
quarantined in a healthcare facility. All others were
quarantined at home.
From 28 April to 4 July, those who returned from a
WHO-designated SARS-affected area were consid-
ered class B, resulting in compulsory home quaran-
tine for ten days.6,9 Passengers arriving could choose
to be quarantined in an airport transit hotel, at
home, or at a quarantine site designated and paid
for by their employer. If these options were not
available, the traveller was quarantined at a gov-
ernment quarantine center located at a military
base. On 9 June quarantine regulations were eased
for the staff of Taiwanese companies based on main-
land China who were returning to Taiwan for busi-
ness. Travellers in this category were allowed to
conduct business if they wore a surgical mask. Public
health nurses from local health departments deliv-
ered food to the home three times a day. Bodytemperature was self-monitored three times a day
and reported by telephone to the public health
nurses. A surgical mask was worn whenever the
quarantined individual entered a communal area
within their own home. If he/she became sick during
the home quarantine period, the driver of the
ambulance took the patient to hospital dressed in
a Tyvek suit, N-95 respirator and gloves. There were
several hundred such ambulance trips for fever
patients between mid-May and July in Taiwan.
Measurement of body temperature
After 10 April all airline passengers, outbound and
inbound, were requested to have their body tem-
perature taken at the airport. People whose body
temperatures were higher than 37.5 8C were exam-
ined further by a physician.
Hospital infection control practice
Mobile SARS containment teams (mobile teams), a
joint program by the Center for Disease Control in
Taiwan and various teaching hospitals, were
initiated three days after the first suspected SARS
case was reported. Seventeen mobile teams, com-
prising infection control physicians, infection con-
trol nurses, rotating staff from the County
Department of Health, staff from the Center for
Disease Control, Taiwan, and staff from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention in the USA, were
deployed from 16 March to 10 May 2003. They
observed and demonstrated the recommended SARS
infection control practices and also provided perso-
nal protective equipment (PPE) to hospitals actively
evaluating patients for SARS infection. Each team
was equipped with an infection control checklist,
personal protective equipment (PPE), blood speci-
men tubes, nasopharyngeal swabs, culture media,
and a specimen cooler. Mobile teams evaluated
infection control practices through observing hospi-
tal personnel, questioning current practices, and
detecting the negative pressure of the isolation
room using a strip of tissue paper at the entrance
of a patient’s isolation room.
Definitions
In this study, the WHO case definition as published in
May 2003 was used. The results were later compared
with those obtained by using the case definition
published in August 2003. In May, a probable case
of SARS was defined as a person presenting after 1
February 2003 with a history of fever higher than
38 8C and one or more of the following symptoms:
lower respiratory tract illness (cough, breathing
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dence of infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or
respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) or autopsy find-
ings consistent with pneumonia without identifiable
cause. The person also needed evidence of one or
more of the following exposures during the ten days
prior to the onset of symptoms: to have had close
contact with a person who is a suspect or probable
case of SARS; to reside in an affected area.7 A
suspect case was a probable case without chest
radiograph or pathological confirmation. Patients
were excluded if an alternative diagnosis could fully
explain their illness.7
On 14 August 2003 WHO proposed a new case
definition, including laboratory confirmation. A clin-
ical case of SARS was defined as a person presenting
a history of fever higher than 38 8C and one or more
symptoms of lower respiratory tract illness (cough,
breathing difficulty, shortness of breath) and radio-
graphic evidence of infiltrates consistent with pneu-
monia or respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) or
autopsy findings consistent with pneumonia without
an identifiable cause. Patients were excluded if an
alternative diagnosis could fully explain their ill-
ness.10 A laboratory case was a clinical case with
positive laboratory finding for SARS-Co-V.10
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS soft-
ware (SPSS 10.0.5, Windows version).11 Univariate
analysis was used to identify factors associated with
outcome. In the univariate analysis, the association
between illness and categorical risk factors was
assessed for statistical significance by the Chi-
square test; the association for continuous variablesFigure 1 Number of cases and outcome of severe acutewas assessed using t-test. A two-sided p-value at a
level of less than 0.05 was considered statistically
significant. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals
(95% CI) were also calculated.Results
Surveillance
The first two suspected cases were diagnosed in a
couple on 14 March 2003. The man was a 54-year-old
businessman who had travelled to Guangdong Pro-
vince, China, on 5 February and returned to Taipei
via Hong Kong on 21 February. On 25 February he
developed fever and myalgia, and later a dry cough,
but was not hospitalized until 8 March. Several hours
after admission he was intubated and required
mechanical ventilation for 13 days. His wife and
son were exposed during the period before full
protective measures were in place, and both devel-
oped SARS with a requirement for mechanical ven-
tilation. The infections in the wife and son were
confirmed by RT-PCR testing to be associated with
the novel coronavirus associated with SARS world-
wide.12—14 On 26 March a resident of Hong Kong’s
Amoy Gardens flew to Taiwan and took a train to
Taichung. The man’s brother became Taiwan’s first
SARS fatality. Between 14 March and 19 April, 51
people met the criteria for a probable case
(Figure 1).
Suddenly, in the last ten days of April, the number
of cases began to increase steadily. The first
increase was in patients and staff at Hospital H
and was attributed to a laundry worker employed
at the hospital, aged 42 years with diabetes mellitusrespiratory syndrome in Taiwan, February — July 2003.
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a fever and diarrhea and was evaluated in the
emergency department. The laundry worker
remained on duty and interacted frequently with
patients, staff, and visitors. He had sleeping quar-
ters in the hospital’s basement and spent off-duty
time socializing in the emergency department. On
16 April, because of worsening symptoms, this
worker was admitted to the hospital with a diag-
nosis of salmonellosis (infectious enteritis) and pul-
monary edema. On 18 April he became short of
breath. A chest radiograph showed bilateral infil-
trates, and the patient was transferred to an iso-
lation room in the intensive care unit with
suspected SARS. This was a potential index patient
because he had been symptomatic for six days
before SARS was diagnosed. The number of poten-
tially exposed persons was estimated at up to
10,000 patients and visitors, and 930 staff. On 24
April Hospital H was contained, and all patients,
visitors, and staff were quarantined within the
building.15 During the period from 29 April to 14
June, a total of 151 SARS patients were transferred
to 11 hospitals (mainly eight hospitals in Taipei
city).
Case clusters at eight additional hospitals in Tai-
wan have been linked to the initial outbreak at
Hospital H. Preliminary data suggested that many
of these clusters occurred when pre-symptomatic
patients, or patients with SARS whose symptoms
were attributed to other causes, were discharged
or transferred to other healthcare facilities. SARS
later spread tomultiple cities and regions of Taiwan,
including several university and private hospitals.Table 1 Demographic characteristics of SARS patients and
Variable Probable cases
Living N (%)
(N = 487)
Mean age in years 47.2  21.1
Sex
Female 272 (78)
Male 215 (67)
Contact tracing
Imported 51 (96)
Household close contact 37 (90)
Health care workers 103 (86)
Doctor 14
Nurse 59
Allied 30
Hospitalized patient 138 (54)
Not identified 158 (80)
Coexisting medical disorder
No 439 (79)
Yes 48 (43)Four of these hospitals, including a 2300-bed facility
in southern Taiwan, discontinued emergency and
routine services.15
Morbidity
Between 14 March and 30 July 2003, a total of 3032
patients were reported to the Department of Health
in Taiwan as having possible SARS. Among them, 668
(22%) patients met the May WHO criteria for a prob-
able case. Among these probable cases, 53 (8%)were
reported to have travelled to mainland China and
Hong Kong in the ten days before the onset of illness,
41 (6%) were close contacts of a known case, 376
(56%) were hospital-related of whom 120 (19%) were
health care workers (17 doctors, 63 nurses, and 40
allied health care workers) and 256 (38%) were in the
same medical ward or had visited their relatives
there (Table 1). Exposure for 198 (30%) could not
be determined. There were 319 (48%) male patients
and 349 (52%) female patients; their mean age was
51.2  20.3 years. A total of 112 (17%) had coexisting
medical conditions: diabetes in 39, cardiovascular
disease in 29, chronic pulmonary disease in 13,
chronic liver disease in three, chronic renal failure
in ten, cancer in 13, immunologic disease in five.
Most of the health care workers were previously
healthy. All patients were ethnic Chinese.
Themost common symptoms at presentationwere
fever (96.9%), cough (62%), breathing difficulty
(28.6%), diarrhea (18.7%), sputum production
(15.1%), sore throat (14.4%), myalgia (13.8%), head-
ache (12.1%), and rigor (11.8%). Less common symp-relationship to fatal outcome, 2003.
p-value
Deceased N (%)
(N = 181)
Total N (%)
(N = 668)
61.8  18.2 51.2  20.3 <0.001
<0.05
77 (22) 349 (52)
104 (33) 319 (48)
<0.001
2 (4) 53 (8)
4 (10) 41 (6)
17 (14) 120 (18)
3 17
4 63
10 40
118 (46) 256 (38)
40 (20) 198 (30)
<0.001
117 (21) 556 (83)
64 (57) 112 (17)
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(4.9%), and vomiting (4.6%).
Mortality
Of the 668 patient cases, 181 (27%) were fatal. This
was a crude mortality rate to provide a comparison
with other countries that used this method. Of the 64
(57%)whodiedwithcoexistingmedicalconditions, 22
had diabetes, 21 cardiovascular disease, nine had
cancer, five had chronic pulmonary disease, three
had chronic renal failure, three had immunologic
disease and one had chronic liver disease (Table 1).
Theaverageageofpatientswhodiedwas61.8  18.2
years (males 64.9  16.9; females 57.6  19.2).
Compared to cases that survived, the fatal cases
were older (61.8  18.2 years vs 47.2  21.1,
p < 0.001), more often male (RR = 1.50, 95% CI
1.2—1.9, p < 0.05), and more often had a coexisting
medical condition (RR = 2.7; 95% CI 2.2—3.4,
p < 0.001).
Themortality by age and sex are shown in Table 2.
Males had higher mortality than females (32.6% vs
22.1%, p < 0.05). For males, the age-specific mor-
tality ranged from 9.4% for persons aged 0—29 years
to 52.5% for those over 60 years. The risk of fatality
was significant (p < 0.001) among patients who
were older than 60 years (RR = 5.6; 95% CI = 2.4—
13.0). For females, the age-specific mortality ran-
ged from 8.1% for persons aged 0—29 years to 57.1%
for person over 60 years. The risk of fatality was
significant (p < 0.001) among patients who were
older than 60 years (RR = 7.1; 95% CI = 3.7—13.6).
It can be seen that mortality increased significantly
(p < 0.0001) with age for males (Chi-square for
linear tread = 37.8) and females (Chi-square for
linear tread = 52.8)
Based on the WHO case definition of August,10
there were 346 confirmed cases with 73 deaths
(directly due to SARS, 37; SARS-related, 36).
The mortality using this definition would be 21.1%Table 2 Mortality of severe acute respiratory syndrome by
Age group (years) Maleb
Cases
(N)
Deaths
N (%)
Relative
(95% CI)
0—29 53 5 (9.4) 1.0 (Refe
30—59 144 35 (24.3) 2.6 (1.1—
60 122 64 (52.5) 5.6 (2.4—
Total 319 104 (32.6)
a x2 test.
b Chi square for linear trend = 37.8, p < 0.0001.
c Chi square for linear trend = 52.8, p < 0.0001.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.001.(73/346), or 10.7% (37/346) when calculated
according to the proposed method.
Laboratory examination
Nasopharyngeal swab and stool specimens obtained
from reported patients were examined by the
laboratory at the Center for Disease Control,
Department of Health in Taiwan. From April through
August 2003, RT-PCR tests of coronavirus were
detected from 3032 patients, and 346 were positive.
The frequency of RT-PCR positive for SARS coro-
navirus varied significantly between probable
cases (37.5%), suspected case (3.5%), and excluded
(0.9%).
Quarantine
Between 28 March and 11 July, a total of 151,270
(class A, 55,315; class B, 95,955) had been quaran-
tined. Among the persons placed under class A
quarantine, 112 were suspected patients of whom
34 or 6.1/10,000 were subsequently classified as
having probable SARS. Among the persons placed
under class B quarantine, 21 were suspected cases
of whom 12 or 1.3/10,000 were subsequently clas-
sified as having probable SARS.
Measurement of body temperature
Between 10 April and 29 July 2003, the total number
of passengers who had their temperature taken
was 2,760,379 (inbound, 1,317,159; outbound,
1,443,220). Among them, 2134 (0.08%) had fever,
of whom four or 1.4/1,000,000 were subsequently
classified as having probable SARS.
Hospital infection control practices
Selected infection control practices in place at the
time of the mobile team visits are summarized inage and sex in Taiwan, February — July 2003.
Femalec
riska Cases
(N)
Deaths
N (%)
Relative riska
(95% CI)
rent) 111 9 (8.1) 1.0 (Referent)
6.2)* 168 28 (16.7) 2.1 (1.0—4.2)*
13.0)** 70 40 (57.1) 7.1 (3.7—13.6)**
349 77 (22.1)
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Table 3 Selected SARS infection control practices at the time of visit for hospitals investigated by mobile teams in
Taiwan, March — May 2003.
Infection control practices Frequency N = 86 %
Administrative measures
Written ICP protocol for SARS 83 97
Triage and segregation of possible SARS case-patients 46 53
Non-SARS patients admitted to same ward 66 77
Restricted traffic outside patients’ rooms 59 69
Hospital policy prohibited visitors from patients’ rooms 65 76
Environmental engineering measures
Private rooms for SARS case-patients 79 92
Handwashing facilities immediately outside patients’ rooms 75 87
Separate dressing area for PPE and anteroom 64 74
Negative air pressure at patients’ doors documented by mobile team 56 65
Personal protective equipment
N-95 or better respirator used by hospital staff 62 72
Hospital staff used eye protection 62 72
Hospital staff used single gown with apron or double gowns 62 72
Hospital staff used double gloves 62 72
Hospital staff used head and foot covers 62 72
SARS: Severe acute respiratory syndrome; ICP: Infection control practices; PPE: Personal protective equipment.Table 3. Between 16 March and 10 May mobile teams
assessed a total of 86 hospitals. Fifty-three percent
of the study hospitals had triage and segregation of
possible SARS case-patients, but 24% (21/86) did not
prohibit visitors from patients’ rooms and 31% (27/
86) did not restrict traffic outside the patients’
rooms.
Of the study hospitals, 87% (75/86) had hand-
washing facilities immediately outside patients’
rooms or anterooms. At the other 11 hospitals,
hand-washing facilities were at a location further
from the anteroom. Seventy-nine (92%) had private
rooms for SARS case-patients and 72% (62/86) had N-
95 or better respirators in stock. Seventy-two per-
cent used at least one layer of protective gown and
had access to eye protection, head covers, and foot
protection.
Overall, at the time of the mobile team visits, 46
(53%) hospitals implemented recommendations of
triage and segregation of possible SARS case-
patients, private negative pressure isolation rooms,
minimal PPE for all staff entering patients’ rooms,
and effective visitor policies (visitors restricted
from patients’ rooms).16,17Discussion
This reported outbreak of SARS in Taiwan caused 668
probable cases with severe deterioration of pulmon-
ary function and 181 deaths. Consistent with other
findings,18,19 healthcare workers in Taiwan were athigher risk of infection from SARS. Within three
months, SARS developed in 120 healthcare workers
after exposure at work in the medical ward where
the index patient was hospitalized. All had unre-
markable medical histories. Recent reports suggest
that infection control practices can be effective in
some settings.20,21 Just over half (53%) of Taiwanese
hospitals had implemented recommended infection
control practice at the time of the mobile team
visits; however, as with another report,22 an out-
break occurred among hospital healthcare workers.
As more becomes known about the transmission
of SARS-associated coronavirus infections, infection
control practices at hospitals evaluating patients for
SARS will need to evolve. Even as the SARS epidemic
appears to wane,23 being prepared for SARS infec-
tion control remains important among hospitals.
Future studies should evaluate the effectiveness
of specific infection control practices, as well as
assess the implementation of effective measures in
countries affected by SARS.
In this study, a substantial difference was docu-
mented in both the number of cases and the mor-
tality rate after applying the WHO definition
proposed in August 2003. It is important to note
that the later definition, published after the out-
break was over, was developed to serve a different
purpose. In May 2003, the case definition focused on
the clinical picture, and was deliberately sensitive
in order to identify most suspected cases and imple-
ment control measures for SARS. The case definition
in August was modified to increase specificity by
84 K.-T. Chen et al.focusing on laboratory confirmed cases. In addition,
the new definition allows for the calculation of a low
mortality mainly by permitting deaths in SARS
patients to be attributed to other underlying dis-
eases and therefore not contribute to the numera-
tor. Including SARS patients regardless of etiology
would prevent subjectivity and provide more uni-
form data for comparison across countries.
Quarantining the contacts is a new challenge to
the public. Within this period between 28 March and
30 July, a total of 151,270 persons (0.7% of the
population of Taiwan) were quarantined. Only 46
(class A, 34; class B, 12) were subsequently classified
as probable cases. In humans infected with the virus
there is a wide range of reported incubation periods,
from five to 15 days, before patients become symp-
tomatic.18,19 This lag time allows apparently
healthy people to travel by air almost anywhere
in the world after they have been exposed. Once
they become symptomatic, the disease is most likely
spread through person-to-person transmission.24 As
expected, based on the known transmission pat-
terns for SARS,19,20 the fact that transmission
appeared to occur from patients in the symptomatic
phase of illness, but not from those who were in the
pre-symptomatic phase, suggests that the risk of
transmission varies by the phase of illness. It is likely
that persons who were in contact with patients with
the pre-symptomatic phase were at low risk. The
fact that transmission has been limited to only close
contacts of patients, such as healthcare workers and
family members who were not using contact or
respiratory precautions, suggests that either dro-
plet secretions or direct contact probably played a
role.4 SARS patients should limit interactions out-
side the home and should not go to work, school,
out-of-home childcare or other public areas until
ten days after the resolution of fever. In Taiwan,
family and other close contacts, those on airplanes
with ill SARS patients (if seated within three rows in
front or three rows behind the patient), and those
returning from SARS affected areas were given
strictly compulsory home quarantine for ten days.
It must be considered whether in the future house-
hold members or other close contacts of SARS
patients need to limit their activities outside the
home as recommended by the USA CDC.25
Epidemiologic investigation and laboratory stu-
dies suggest that most patients with illnesses meet-
ing the case definition of SARS in Taiwan were linked
to a common source. To date, 37.5% of cases iden-
tified in this report were confirmed positive.
In this study, some clinical and laboratory fea-
tures were identified on presentation that were
associated with death. Advanced age, being male,
and coexisting underlying medical conditions wereindependent predictors of mortality from SARS.
Information on hepatitis B status was not system-
atically collected, a risk factor reported else-
where.26
SARS has already become a global health hazard,
and its high infectivity is alarming. The decrease in
worldwide incidence is gratifying; but it may simply
reflect the seasonal variation in the transmission of
the virus.24 Some experts have predicted the return
of SARS in the cool season. Containing an outbreak
at an early stage affords a greater chance of success
than does a later response and clearly puts less
strain on the healthcare system. Future strategies
to control the spread of SARS need to emphasize the
greater risk to certain populations: health care
workers, older people, and people who have chronic
diseases. Isolation of cases, stringent infection con-
trol measures in hospitals, and vigilant surveillance
at both community and population levels are
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